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20 Aralık 2008 Cumartesi

Aralıkta Dünya Edebiyatı-World Literature in Between



Varlık dergisinin 75. Yıldönümü etkinlikleri kapsamında, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, Kültür AŞ ve KA Araştırma Ltd. Şirketi'nin ortak destekleri ile İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Santralistanbul kampüsünde düzenlenen "Aralıkta Dünya Edebiyatı" Sempozyumu üç gün boyunca konunun takipçileri tarafından büyük ilgi ile karşılandı.
18-19-20 Aralık günlerini kapsayan ve toplam 5 panelden oluşan sempozyum kapsamında Türk ve dünya edebiyatının önemli isimleri, akademisyenler, edebiyat eleştirmenleri ve edebiyat çevreleri ve tabii ki öğrenciler, biraraya gelerek edebiyatın hem kendisini hem de diğer sosyolojik ve tarihsel durumlarla ilişkisini tartıştılar.



Karşılaştırmalı Edebiyat.com olarak ancak 19 Aralık Cuma günü, Ferda Keskin yönetiminde gerçekleştirilen, “Milliyetçilik ve Kozmopolitlik/Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism” ana temalı 3.panele katılabilmiş olsak da konferans salonunun havasını, kısa süreliğine de olsa, solumuş olmak güzeldi. Katıldığımız panelin konuşmacıları ve sunumlarını sıralarsak :

Bruce Robbins (Columbia Üniversitesi) "Hipotetik Bir Yıldız Gözlemcisi: Chomsky ve Kozmopolitlik/A Hypothetical Extraterrestrial Observer: Chomsky and Cosmopolitanism"
Mads Rosendahl Thomsen (Aarhus Üniversitesi, Danimarka), “Edebiyat Tarihine Bir Meydan Okuma Olarak Uluslararası Edebiyatlar/Transnational Literatures as a Challenge to Literary History”
Süreyyya Evren, “Üç Bayrağı Yakmak / Milliyetçilik, Anarşistlik ve Edebiyat-Burning Three Flags / Nationalism, Anarchism and Literaturet”
Murat Belge (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi), “Türk Edebiyatında Milliyetçilik ve Kozmopolitlik / Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in Turkish Literature”



Halen devam eden sempozyumun bugünkü son programı ise şöyle:

20 Aralık

10:00-12:00: Panel 4, “Şarkiyatçılıktan Sonra Edebiyat”
Yöneten: Bruce Robbins (Columbia Üniversitesi)
Konuşmacılar:
Aamir Müfti (UCLA), “Şarkiyatçılık ve Dünya Edebiyatının Kurumlaşması”
Sabry Hafez (SOAS), “Şarkiyatçılıktan Sonra Edebiyat ve Garbın Süregelen Cazibesi”
Burcu Gürsel (Pennsylvania Üniversitesi), “Din, Eşitlik, Akıl: Osmanlı ve Fransız Egemen Söylemlerinin Savaş Alanı Olarak Mısır”
12:00-13:00: Öğle Yemeği
13:00-15:00: Panel 5, “Sürgünde Karşılaştırmalı Edebiyat”
Yöneten: Faruk Birtek (Boğaziçi Üniversitesi)
Konuşmacılar:
David Damrosch (Harvard Üniversitesi), “Sürgünden Sonra: İstanbul’dan Geçen Yollar”
Emily Apter (NYU), “Bağlamında ve Dışında Hümanizm: Edward Said’in Sürgün Karşılaştırmacılığı”
Djelal Kadir (Penn State Üniversitesi), “Karşılaştırmalı Edebiyatın Konumu”
15:30-17:30: Yuvarlak Masa ve Tartışma
Yöneten: David Damrosch (Harvard Üniversitesi)
Konuşmacılar: Karşılaştırmalı Edebiyat/ Dünya Edebiyatı Öğrencileri


December 20
10:00-12:00: Panel 4, “Literature after Orientalism”
Chair: Bruce Robbins
Speakers:
Aamir Müfti (UCLA), “Orientalism and the Institution of World Literatures”
Sabry Hafez (SOAS), “Literature after Orientalism and the Enduring Lure of the Occident”
Burcu Gürsel (University of Pennsylvania), “Religion, Equality, Intellect: Egypt as the Battleground for Ottoman and French Sovereign Discourses”
12:00-13:00: Lunch
13:00-15:00: Panel 5, “Comparative Literature in Exile”
Chair: Faruk Birtek (Boğaziçi University)
Speakers:
David Damrosch (Harvard University), “After Exile: İstanbul Trajectories”
Emily Apter (NYU), “Humanism in and out of Place: Edward Said's Exilic Comparatism”
Djelal Kadir (Penn State University), “The Place of Comparative Literature”
15:30-17:30: Round Table and Discussion
Moderator: David Damrosch
Discussants: International Students of Comparative/World Literature

Akademik edebiyat çalışmalarına bir taş daha ekleyen bu etkinlikte emeği geçen herkese çok teşekkür ediyoruz.
Varlık Yayınlarından çıkacak olan sempozyum derlemesini ise merakla bekliyoruz...

Devamı...

15 Aralık 2007 Cumartesi

Post-Modernism as a Critical Theory

The term postmodernism originated among artists and critics in New York in the 1960's and was taken up by European theorists in the 1970’s. One of these theorists is Jean-Francois Lyotard in his famous book called "The Postmodern Condition" he attached the legitimating myths of the modern age (the grand narratives),that is.. the progressive liberation of humanity through science and the idea that philosophy can restore unity to learning and develop universally valid knowledge for humanity. Postmodern theory became identified with the critique of universal knowledge. Lyotard believes that we can no longer talk about a totalizing idea of reason. For there is no reason, only reasons.
In arts the deletion of the boundry between art and everyday life; the collapse of the hierarchical distinction between elite and popular culture, a stylistic eclecticism and the mixing of codes are the issues which are highlighted in postmodern theory. The decline of the originality and genius view of the artistic producer has been replaced by the assumption that art can only be repetitous. A shift of emphasis from content to form or style, a transformation of reality into images, the fragmentation of time into a series of perpetual presents are the new key concepts. There are continual references to eclecticism, reflexivity, self referentiality, quotation, artifice, randomness, anarchy, fragmentation, pastiche and allegory. There is a tendency to "textualize" everything: history, philosophy, sociology and other disciplines are treated as 'kinds of writing' or discourses. Western societies underwent a radical transformation since the 11 World War; Media society, the Society of the Spectacle, consumer society, the bureaucratic society of controlled consumption, post-industrial society are the names given to our contemporary society.
Lyotard claims that in the last 40 years all the leading sciences and technologies have become increasingly concerned with language; theories of linguistics, problems of communication and cybernetics, computers and their languages, problems of translation, information storage and data banks. The technological transformations have a considerable impact on knowledge. The machine industry changes the way in which learning is acquired, classified, made available and exploited.
Now according to Lyotard the nature of knowledge is bound to change,. It cannot remain unchanged as it was. He believes that knowledge which cannot be translatable into computer language will be abandoned, it is doomed to disappear. The old principle that the acquisition of knowledge is indissocible from the training of minds, or even of individuals is no longer valid, it is obsolete. Knowledge is already ceasing to be an end in itself. It is and will be produced in order to be sold.
Now computerized knowledge changed the composition of the work force of the most highly developed countries. (There is a decrease in the number of factory and agricultural workers and increase in professional technical and white collar workers) Knowledge will be the major component in the worldwide competition for power and it is possible that nation-states will one day fight for control of information. Knowledge is competence according to Lyotard; it is beyond simple determination and application of the criteria of truth. It extends to the determination of the criteria of efficiency, of justice and of happiness (ethical wisdom) of beauty (auditory and visual sensibility).

Under the impact of Wittgenstein, Lyotard classifies knowledge in 3 groups. Knowledge makes us capable of forming 3 types of utterances

1)denotative(true /false distinction is important)

2)prescriptive(just /unjust distinction)

3)evaluative(efficient/ inefficient)

Each of the various categories of utterances can be defined in terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which they can be put. The rules of language games do not carry within themselves their own legitimation but are objects of a contract, explicit or not, between players. If there are no rules, there is no game. Every utterance is thought of a "move" in a game.
To use language is to fight; questions, requests, assertions, and narratives are launched into battle. The war is not without rules, but the rules allow and encourage the greatest flexibility of utterance.

There are two types of knowledge: Scientific and narrative.
Scientific Knowledge doesn't represent the totality of knowledge, it has always existed in competition and conflict with other kinds of knowledge which Lyotard calls narrative. Narratives are popular stories, myths, legends and tales) they represent positive or negative models of integration into established institutions, narratives determine criteria of competence and /or illustrate how they are to be applied. They thus define what has the right to be said and done in the culture in question.

In traditional societies a narrative tradition is also the tradition of the criterion defining a threefold competence-know-how -, knowing how to speak, knowing how to hear through which the community's relationship to itself and its environment is played out. Truth and justice and beauty are woven together. What is transmitted through these narratives is set of rules that constitute the social bond. Scientific rules underlie what 19th century science calls verification and 20th century falsification. They allow a horizon of consensus. Now scientists need an addressee, a partner who can verify their statements and in turn become the sender, equals are needed and must be created. In scientific knowledge any already accepted statement can be challenged. The main difference between scientific knowledge and narrative knowledge is that scientific knowledge requires that one language game/ denotation be retained and other games be excluded. Both science and narrative knowledge are equally necessary. Both are composed of sets of statements. The statements are moves made by the players within the frame work of generally applicable rules. These rules are specific to each particular kind of knowledge and "moves" judged to be 'good' in one cannot be the same as those judged 'good' in another game (statements) Narrative knowledge certifies itself without recourse to argumentation and proof. Narratives belong to savage, primitive, underdeveloped cultures. They are composed of opinions, customs, authority, prejudice, ignorance, and ideology.However scientific knowledge cannot know or make known that it is the true knowledge without resorting to the other that is narrative kind of knowledge.

Lyotard believes that the unconscious is the OTHER of language. He associates the unconscious with figural representation and the preconscious with language. Language is on the side of censorship and repression whereas figural representation is on the side of desire and transgression. Lyotard thinks of modern art as fragmentary and believes that it is liberatory. Fragmentation and disruption are attempts to make unconscious process visible. Artithen, involves the disruption of convention.

Source: Madan Sarup, Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism, 1993, Athens.
Also edited from reading notes of Critical Theory course.

Devamı...

14 Aralık 2007 Cuma

Structuralism as a Critical Theory

The author is no longer important, the author is "dead". Literature does not tell any truth about life. The author has to draw upon the immense dictionary of language and culture which is 'always already written'. It would not be misleading to use the term 'anti-humanist' to describe the spirit of structuralism. They emphasize their opposition to all forms of literary criticism in which the human subject is the source and origin of literary meaning.



The linguistic background: Saussure; "What is the object of linguistic investigation?" "What is the relationship between words and things?" The distinction between langue and parole, between the language system which preexists actual examples of language and the individual utterance. Langue is the social aspect of language; it is the shared system which we (unconsciously) draw upon as speakers. Parole is the individual realization of the system in actual instances of language. The proper object of linguistic study is the system which underlies any particular human signifying "5 practice, not the individual utterance. This means that, if we examine specific poems or myths or economic practices, we do so in order to discover what system of rules- what grammar- is being used. Saussure believes that words are not symbols which correspond to referents, but rather are signs which are made up of two parts; a mark, either written or spoken, called "a signifier" and a concept (what is 'thought' when the mark is made) called a "signified".

SIGN= Signifier/signified

Things have no place in the model whereas the old model is

symbol=Thing

The relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary. Language is one among many sign-systems, the system of such

systems is called 'semiotics'. Instead of asking questions

about the origins or causes of the prohibitions, myths or rites, the structuralist looks for the systems of differences which underlies a particular human practice. Roland Barthes: he recognizes that the language system may change, and that changes must be initiated in 'speech', nevertheless, at any given moment there exists a working set of rules, a set of rules from which all 'speeches” may be derived. For example, he sees the wearing of garments not as a matter of personal expression or individual style, but as a 'garment system' which works like a language. He divides 'language' of garments between 'system' and 'speech'.

SYSTEM SYMTAGM

Set of pieces, parts or 'Juxtaposition in the

details which cannot be worn same type of dress of

at the same time on the same different elements:

part of the body, and whose skirt-blouse-jacket'

variation corresponds to a change in the meaning of the clothing toque-bonnet-hood '

Vladimir Fropp:

1 .Functions of characters serve as stable, constant elements
in a tale, independently of how and by whom they are
fulfilled. They constitute the fundamental components of
a tale.

2 .The number of functions known to the fairy tale is limited (31)

3 .The sequence of functions is always identical.

4 .All fairy tales are of one type in regard to their structure.

The thirty-one functions, Propp finds, are distributed among seven 'spheres of action' corresponding to their 'respective performers' as follows:

* the villain
* the donor (provider)
* the helper
* the princess ( a sought, for person) and her father
* the dispatcher
* the hero
* the false hero

The last group of functions may be listed as

* A difficult task is proposed to the hero
* The task is resolved
* The hero is recognised
* The false hero or villain is exposed
* The false hero is given anew appearance
* The villain is punished
* The hero is married and ascends the throne

Greimas: Subject/Object

Sender / receiver

Helper / opponent

The pairs describe three basic patterns which perhaps- recur in all narrative:

1. Desire, search, or aim (subject/object)
2. Communication (sender/ receiver)
3. Auxiliary support or hindrance (helper/opponent)

*

Narratives may employ either of the following structures:

1. contract (or prohibition)-violation-punishment

2. contractual; lack of contract (disorder)« establishment of contract (order)

3.disjunctional; departure and returns

4. performative; tests, struggles ..

Tzevan Todorov; The minimal unit of narrative is the “proposition”, which can be either an 'agent' (a person) or a predicate (an action) the propositional structure of a narrative can be described in the most abstract and universal fashion.

X is king X marries Y

Y is X's mother X kills Z

Z is X's father

These are some of the propositions which make up the narrative of the Oedipus myth. For X read Oedipus, for Y Jocasta, for Z, Laius . The first three propositions denominate agents, the first and the last two contain predicates (to be king, to marry, to kill) Predicates may work like adjectives and refer to static states of affairs (to be a king), or they may operate dynamically like verbs to indicate transgressions of law and are therefore the most dynamic types of proposition. The smallest unit is the proposition then comes the sequence and the text, a group of propositions forms a sequence, the basic sequence is made up of five propositions which describe a certain state which is disturbed and then reestablished in altered forms. The five propositions may be designated thus,

* Equilibrium (peace)
* Force (enemy invades)
* Disequilibrium (war)
* Force (enemy is defeated)
* Equilibrium (peace on new terms)

Gerard Genette
# perspective and voice perspective (who sees the action) voice (who speaks the narration of it)
# order, duration, frequency
# fabula and sjuzet

The first category concerns the relation between the order of events in the fabula, which is always chronological, and the order of events in the sjuzet, which of course need not be. the second category concerns the relation between the putative duration of events in the fabula and the time taken to narrate them in the sjuzet (therefore to read the narration), which may be longer or shorter or approximately the same. The third category concerns the relationship between the number of times an event occurs in the fabula and the number of times it is narrated in the sjuzet.


Roman Jacobson

Factors which are involved in verbal communication:

addresser content addressee

message

contact

code

The addresser sends a message to the addressee. To be operative the message requires a content, sizeable by the addressee. The message must be capable of being verbalized in a code; the code must be fully or partially common to the addresser or addressee. Contact is the physical channel or psychological connection between the addresser and addressee.

Functions of Language.

Each of these factors determine a function of language.

emotive: focused on the addresser; aims a direct expression of the speaker's attitude toward what he is speaking about. A man using expressive features to indicate his angry or ironic attitude conveys ostensible information, conative: focused on the addressee, it is vocative and iImperative referential: focused on the content, it is denotative and cognitive

phatic: focused on the contact; "Hello, do you hear me" x to attract the attention of the interlocutor or to confirm his continued attention.

metalingual: focused on the code, "I don't follow you, what do you mean” : metalanguage means speaking of language.

Poetic: focused on the message. This function should not be
reduced to poetry or poetry should not be confined to poetic function . Poetic function is only the dominant, determining function of verbal art but not the sole function. "I like Ike" /...L..k...k / The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination, selection: if the topic of the message is child, the speaker selects more or less similar nouns such as kid, youngster...Selection is based upon equivalence, similarity, dissimilarity, synonymity, antonymty. combination: it is based on contiguity.

- Edited from reading notes of Critical Theory course; discontinuity might be possible.

Devamı...

13 Aralık 2007 Perşembe

The Sphere of Cultures-1

Signifying orders manifest themselves temporally and spatially in institutional structures that we will call spheres in this text. Cultural spheres are, in a certain sense, "domesticating" systems. Living no longer principally in the wilderness, where their hominid ancestors had to rely primarily on instinct for survival, tribal humans came to depend primarily upon communal spheres for the bare necessities of life...
Anthropologists divide the mam spheres into primary—kinship and religious—and secondary—political, legal, economic, and educational. Primary spheres are characterized by face-to-face modes of communication and interaction and by a feeling of solidarity. Secondary spheres, on the other hand, are based on more conventionalized and impersonal forms of communication and interaction. The latter took on greater importance in the first super-tribal collectivities, where consensual patterns of interaction would have been impossible on the basis of the primary spheres alone.
The word consensus requires further elaboration here. It means, literally, "sense-making together." In a collectivity of any kind, consensus implies adherence to the norms of behavior and communication that are deemed appropriate by the collectivity as a whole. These are established and enforced primarily by those who are centrally located within the most dominant sphere in a collectivity at a specific point in time. If that sphere is the religious one, for instance, then the leader or leaders of that sphere will dictate what the norms are; if it is the political sphere, then those located in a central position within that sphere will determine them. Those who do not comply with such norms risk censure, punishment, and/or marginalization. Indeed, those who reject them outright must show the validity of why they are doing so publicly. Otherwise, in all kinds of societies they risk facing some form of rebuke, chastisement, or castigation.

The Kinship Sphere
In his monumental study of social organization, Charles H. Cooley (1909) defined kinship as the primary sphere of culture par excellence, giving stability and perpetuity to the activities of the tribe. However defined, membership in a kinship unit provides every human being with a primary identity and a vital sense of belonging. This is why people tend to feel a "kinship bond" when they meet a stranger of the same lineal descent, and why, at some point or other in their lives, many (if not most) individuals tend to become interested in where the "roots" of their "family tree" lead. As the great sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) remarked, leadership in early tribal cultures tended to emerge typically from within kinship units, because their communal activities revolved around the family with the most power and ability to withstand opposition from within the tribe.
The central feature of the kinship sphere is the primary mother-child bond, to which diverse cultures have added different familial relations by the principle of descent, which connects one generation to the other in a systematic way and which determines certain rights and obligations across generations. Descent groups are traced typically through both sexes, i.e. bilaterally, or through only the male or the female link, i.e. unilaterally. In unilateral systems the descent is known as patrilineal if the derivation is through the male line, or tnatrilineal if it is through the female line. Anthropological surveys of kinship systems have shown in recent years that half of the world's cultures are patrilineal, one-third bilateral, and the remainder matrilineal. Bilateral kinship systems are characteristic of modern-day hunting-gathering tribes, such as the !Kung of the Kalahari Desert in southern Africa and the Inuit in northern Canada; and they are becoming increasingly characteristic of modern Western societies as well. Less frequent ways for tracing descent are the parallel system, in which males and females each trace their ancestry through their own sex, and die cognatic method, in which the relatives of both sexes are considered, with little formal distinction between them.
Kin members are everywhere categorized in ways that assign specific roles and expected behaviors to each individual. The categories are represented by the names given to individuals. These may also indicate how a kinship sphere assigns the inheritance of goods and property. The latmul of New Guinea, for instance, assign five different names to the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth child in such a way that in any quarrels over inheritance, the first and third children are expected to join forces against the second and the fourth.

The Religious Sphere

The idea that there is life beyond death is an ancient one, as borne out by the discovery that the ritualized burial of the dead is at least 350,000 years old. This is a truly extraordinary idea that has dictated the course of cultural evolution since ancient times; but why it became an intrinsic feature of human consciousness constitutes a mystifying enigma. Suffice it to say for the present purposes that the notion of a spiritual after-life is the motivation behind the emergence of religion in human cultures.
The religious sphere can be defined as a communal system of interaction and complex rituals designed to reflect the will of the gods or of the powers and forces that are believed to reside in the world of the afterlife. As such, this system ties people together, allowing them to express a common sense of purpose beyond immediate life. The term religion stems from the Latin word religio "to bind, fasten," an etymology that reflects how in early cultures an individual was perceived to be bound by certain mystical or metaphysical (literally "beyond the physical") rites and symbols to the tribe in which s/he was reared. To live "unreligiously" would have implied rejecting the tribe's signifying order that bound the tribal members together. The salient feature of early religious belief systems was the absence of any sharp boundary line between the spiritual and the natural worlds, a characteristic that is still found in some modern-day religious practices such as Shinto, a religion practiced in Japan. The Japanese term Shinto (from shin "spirit") means both "the way of the gods" and "the way of the spirit." The term is also used in common Japanese discourse as an exclamation similar to "Wonderful!" In Shinto, every human being, rock, tree, animal, stream is perceived as having its own wonder. There is no doctrine, creed, or formulated canonical system; Shinto is fundamentally concerned with expressing wonder, respect, and awe for everything that exists. This concern involves treating everything as if it were a person, not in the sense of being inhabited by some human-like ghost or spirit, but in the sense of having a mysterious and independent life of its own that should not be taken for granted.

Tribal metaphysical beliefs led to the establishment of astrology as one of the first sciences. Its widespread popularity in today's secular cultures bears concrete witness to the persistence of the tribal concept that human character and destiny are intertwined with natural processes. The Chaldeans, who lived in Babylon, developed one of the original forms of astrology as early as 3000 BC. The Chinese started practicing astrology around 2000 BC. Other varieties emerged in ancient India and among the Maya of Central America. Astrology grew out of observations that certain astronomical bodies, particularly the sun, affected the change of seasons and the success of crops. From such observations, ancient tribal peoples developed a system of metaphysics by which the movements of other bodies such as the planets affected or represented all aspects of life. By around 500 BC, astrology had spread to Greece, where such philosophers as Pythagoras and Plato incorporated it into their study of religion and the cosmos. Astrology was widely practiced in Europe through the Middle Ages, despite its condemnation by the Church. Many scholars of the era viewed astrology and astronomy as complementary sciences until about the 1500s. Only then did the discoveries made by astronomers undermine astrology as a science.
The importance of the religious sphere to the constitution of culture can be seen in the fact that wizards, priests, and shamans have always tended to he the lenders of a tribe as a whole (or to share the leadership with a powerful clan). These were thought to have direct contact with supernatural beings and forces, and thus to be endowed with magical powers that allowed them to cure diseases and to influence the course of events in the world. Early ritualistic practices were invariably organized and supervised by such leaders. In the super-tribal arrangements of the ancient world, however, religious leaders retained only a part of their authority, having to share power increasingly with leaders coming out of the emerging political sphere. With the rise of complex social systems and civilizations these two spheres developed increasingly autonomous, but complementary, functions.

Source: Analyzing cultures: an introduction and handbook / Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron. Bloomington : Indiana University Press, c1999.

Devamı...

The Sphere of Culture-2

The idea of religious feeling as a personal, cosmological view of the world, reflecting a profound spiritual need to know oneself, came out of the ancient civilizations, when the binding function of religious rites could no longer be maintained intact given the presence of competing religious systems and ideas within the new super-tribal cities.

Hence, individuals started to experiment with religious feelings independently of tribal practices, developing a broader and more personal view of spirituality separate from, albeit originally derived from, the tribal version.
Religions with a strong theistic system of belief arose in the ancient civilizations, which provided the social conditions for people to develop a marked sense of demarcation between subjective consciousness and the natural world. This led to a view of the universe as having a pattern to it that humans did not invent, but that they discovered by reasoning about it. The more people appreciated the complexity of the pattern, the more they tended to formulate a conception of a Supreme Intelligence (monotheism) or Intelligences (polytheism), immeasurably greater than a mere mortal, who must know it in its entirety.

The religious sphere continues to be a part even of modern-day secular societies, where religious rituals and symbols continue to form the fabric of modern cultures, even if people are no longer aware of their religious derivations. As the Canadian literary critic Northrop Frye (1912-1991) argued, in his book The Great Code (1981), religious symbols remain as residues in the artistic practices and in the everyday discourse patterns of even those societies that define themselves as largely secular. I;rye showed how the Bible, for example, is the implicit code sustaining and informing Western literature, art, and social institutions. Anyone who has not had access to this code, Frye suggested, will simply not understand the Western world. The stories of Adam and Eve, of the Tower of Babel, of Paradise lost and regained, of the Flood and Noah's Ark have supplied not only the themes for the great art and literary works of Western civilization, but also the symbols shaping the daily thought and discourse patterns of Western peoples, even if most have never read the Bible. The signifying order is built from this code, diffusing its meanings throughout the entire social system. In the English language, for instance, life is commonly referred to as a journey through the waters (the Ark story), human beings as fallen creatures (the Adam and Eve story), and so on. So, too, cultures with different religious traditions have their own codes that must be accessed through their signifying orders in order to interpret the deeper strata of meanings that are expressed in their arts, literatures, and languages.

The Political Sphere

The need for stability and social cohesiveness in the emerging super-tribal systems of the ancient world led to a rise in the prominence and influence of secondary cultural spheres. Awareness of the growing role of the political sphere in human affairs, for instance, can already be seen in Plato (c. 428-347 BC), who attempted to reconcile the religious and political spheres by proposing a model of a community that would be governed by an aristocracy of "philosopher-kings." But it was Aristotle (384-322 BC) who recognized the ever-increasing power of the political, legal, and economic spheres in city-state cultures. In his Politics, he suggested that these were often in conflict with the religious sphere because of the tension created by their overlapping moral jurisdictions.

This tension extended well into the Middle Ages, an era in Western history characterized by a protracted struggle for supremacy between the Roman Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire. This conflict was reflected in the scholarly writing of the era. The philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), for instance, defended the traditional role of the Church in his Summa Tlieologica (1265-1273), while the great Italian poet Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) argued, in his De Monorchia (c. 1313), for a united Christendom under one emperor and pope, each supreme in his appropriate sphere. By the time of the Renaissance, intellectuals like Niccolo Machiavelli (1459-1527) transcended the traditional church-state debate by evaluating the problems and possibilities of governments seeking to maintain power in non-religious, non-moralistic ways. Some years later, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) argued that the power of the political sphere in regulating the affairs of a culture should be unlimited, since he believed culture to be primarily a "social contract" which individuals livtain groups of people continue to prefer the strictly religious form of education. Private or separate schools, as they are commonly called, exist typically for this reason. Thus, the age-old tug between the religious and secular spheres for control of the minds of children continues to characterize education in societies throughout the world.

Source: Analyzing cultures: an introduction and handbook / Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron. Bloomington : Indiana University Press, c1999.

Devamı...

12 Aralık 2007 Çarşamba

Society, Race, Civilization, Nation-1

As mentioned, the first signifying orders were forged in tribal settings. These came about, arguably, to help tribal people regulate and safe­guard the ways in which they lived, planned, and communicated. The early tribal orders thus probably emerged to satisfy the apparent need... the first sentient and reflective human beings felt to preserve and transmit to subsequent generations any experiences they perceived were meaningful, any communal forms of expression they thought were useful, and any knowledge or skill they felt served some benefi­cial function.

Archeological evidence suggests that as the members of the early tribes became more culturally sophisticated around 10,000 in a society agreed to accept so that they could protect themselves from their own brutish instincts and make possible the satisfaction of desires.Political and legal systems probably started out in the shadow of human needs, urges, and fears, as Hobbes maintained. But the fact that they overlapped with religious spheres in early societies suggests that there was more to the emergence of politics in human affairs than just the regulation of brutish instincts. The rise of the political sphere in human cultures probably reflected the reorientation of the "communal gaze" away from looking "up" or "beyond" to the gods for guidance, as it was accustomed to doing in tribal contexts, to looking "down" to­wards the more immediate, secular world of human leaders. As the philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) observed, this is why political and legal systems, unlike religious ones, can be legitimately overthrown if they fail to discharge their functions to the people since, unlike relig­ious systems, these are perceived as being totally the brainchildren of human minds.

The Legal Sphere

Rudimentary types of legal systems existed in early tribal cultures. They were a blend of custom, religion, and magic grounded in consen­sus about what was appropriate and right for the tribe as a whole. The visible authority was the powerful clan member and/or the religious ruler; the ultimate authorities were the gods, whose will was thought to be revealed in the forces of Nature and in the revelations of the relig­ious leader. Wrongs against the tribe, such as acts of sacrilege or breaches of custom, were met with group sanctions, ridicule, and hos­tility. The wrath of the gods, on the other hand, was appeased typically through ritualistic ceremonies ending in sacrifice or in the expulsion of the wrongdoer. Wrongs against individuals, such as murder, theft, adultery, or failure to repay a debt, were avenged by the family of the victim, often in the form of actions against the family of the wrongdoer.In the early super-tribal collectivities, secondary legal spheres grew in tandem with political systems. Courts and written laws were estab­lished to replace religious principles or rules and the advice-giving practices of tribal chieftains, elders, or shamans. One of the first set of written laws dates from Hammurabi (died 1750 BC), King of Babylon, who united the diverse tribes in Mesopotamia by strategically conquer­ing territories in the region from approximately 1792 to 1750 BC.The first significant example of a written legal code is the ancient Roman one—a code that has influenced most of the legal systems of the modern world. In the eighth century BC the legal sphere of Rome was characterized largely by a blend of custom and interpretation by magistrates of the will of the gods. But the magistrates eventually lost their legitimacy as the plebeian classes threatened to revolt against their dis­criminatory practices. This led to one of the most consequential devel­opments in the history of law—the Twelve Tables of Rome, which con­sisted of laws engraved on bronze tablets in the fifth century BC. Con­cerned with matters of property, payment of debts, and appropriate compensation for damage to persons, these tables are the source for the widespread modern belief that fairness in human affairs demands that laws regulating human conduct be expressed in writing.The common-law system of England is another well-known his­torical example of a legal code that was devised to replace previous systems. Before the Norman Conquest (1066), England was a loose con­federation of societies, whose laws were largely tribal in origin. The Anglo-Norman rulers then created a system of centralized courts that operated under a single set of laws that superseded the rules laid down by earlier societies. The resulting legal system, known as the Common Law of England, began with laws for common customs, but over time involved the courts in constantly revising laws.

The Economic Sphere

Economic activities in tribal societies were based on hunting, gathering, and the exchange of manufactured goods. As such activities expanded in new super-tribal collectivities, the economic sphere gained more and more autonomy, taking on a greater role in the development of tech­nology and in shaping signifying orders.The importance and legitimacy of the economic sphere in the West­ern world were discussed by Adam Smith (1723-1790) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Although the two had many differences of opinion, they shared the view that private property and free markets were the cornerstones of all successful modern economic systems. Opposition to the Smith-Mill view came primarily from social theorists like Karl Marx (1818-1883), for whom the very principle of private property and free markets was the key to the inequities and exploitation that characterize modern societies. Marx believed that this principle was certain to falter because it reflected the inequitable practice of concentrating income and wealth in ever fewer hands, thus creating increasingly severe crises of unemployment and social unrest.

The Educational Sphere

In tribal cultures, the vital function of transmitting the signifying order to subsequent generations was, and continues to be, carried out within the primary spheres. In ancient Egypt, for instance, the priests of the society also taught writing, science, mathematics, and architecture in temple schools. To this day, these spheres are still perceived as critical in guaranteeing the preservation and perpetuation of the signifying order—i.e. they are felt to be fundamental in imparting to young chil­dren what they should know first about the world, what language they should learn to speak, and what values they should acquire. But in modern cultures today the function of educating the young after the neonatal and early infancy periods of development is expected to take place through a secondary sphere—known more commonly as the school system—which provides professionally-trained individuals for this task.It was the ancient Greeks who dislodged schooling from the relig­ious sphere. In the Greece of classical times the practice of assigning the teaching of the liberal arts, mathematics, philosophy, aesthetics, and gymnastic training to secular teachers trained in each of these areas grew out of the notion of a "well-rounded" education. After an initial period of intense loyalty to the old religious traditions, Roman society approved the appointment of Greek teachers, but eventually developed its own highly-trained secular educators.

According to the first-century educator Quintilian (c. 35-95 AD), the proper training of the child was to be organized around the study of language, literature, philosophy, and the sciences, with particular attention to be paid to the develop­ment of character. As the Roman Empire declined, Christianity became a potent cultural force in the countries of the Mediterranean region and in several other areas of Europe. Since then the history of education in Western society has been marked by a struggle between religious and secular forces for control of this vital sphere. The early Fathers of the Church, especially St. Augustine (354-430 AD), emphasized the devel­opment of educational methods and curricula that reflected Christian ideas. Two revivals of learning took place in the ninth century, one on the Continent, under Charlemagne (742-814 AD), and one in England, under King Alfred the Great (849-899 AD). Between the eighth and the eleventh centuries the Moorish conquerors of Spain revived the secular idea of the Roman university in the capital city of Cordoba, which be­came a center for the study of philosophy, ancient civilizations, science, and mathematics in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.In the same centuries, education came under the influence of the ideas and doctrines of the Scholastic theologians, who reconciled Chris­tian theology with the pre-Christian philosophical ideas of Aristotle and Plato. The theologian Peter Abelard (1079-1142?), pupil of St. Thomas Aquinas, and other renowned Scholastic teachers attracted many students, laying the intellectual foundations for the establish­ment of universities in the north of Europe in the twelfth century.Of significance to the development of schooling systems during the Middle Ages were the views of Muslim and Jewish scholars. Not only did they promote advanced forms of education within their own socie­ties, but they also served as translators of ancient Greek writings, thus bringing the ideas of the classical world to the attention of European scholars. Many excellent teachers of the Greek language and literature who had migrated from Constantinople to Italy influenced the work of European educators such as the Dutch humanist Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536?) and the French essayist Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592). The major emphasis of this period was, therefore, on the classical sub­jects taught in the Latin grammar school, which remained as the chief secondary school of Europe until the early twentieth century.During the seventeenth century, the emphasis shifted towards sci­entific disciplines. Influenced by the writings of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Christ's Hospital in London was probably the first secon­dary school to introduce a curriculum based on scientific subjects. That was also the century in which the French philosopher and mathemati­cian Rene Descartes (1596-1650) emphasized the use of logical reason­ing as a fundamental skill to be honed by educational curricula, while John Locke (1632-1704), like Bacon before him, recommended a cur­riculum and method of education based on the empirical examination of demonstrable facts before reaching conclusions. But the greatest educator of the century was Jan Komensky, the Protestant bishop of Moravia, better known by his Latin name, Comenius (1592-1670). Comenius emphasized stimulating the pupil's interest and teaching with reference to concrete things rather than to verbal or logical de­scriptions of them. He clearly foreshadowed modern-day educational techniques.The foremost educational theorist of the eighteenth century was Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), who insisted that educators should treat children as children, not as miniature adults, cultivating the per­sonality of the individual child with great care and devotion. Moti­vated by Rousseau's persuasive arguments, governments in England, France, Germany, Italy, and other European countries established obligatory national school systems designed to actualize Rousseau's idea that true education was to be based on the needs and potentials of the child, rather than on the needs of society or the precepts of religion.

This "child-centered" view of education was entrenched further in the Western mindset by the work of the American philosopher and educa­tor John Dewey (1859-1952). Dewey's ideas continue to inform the major methods of instruction in elementary schools of the United States and other Western countries to the present day.In the twentieth century secular educational systems became preva­lent throughout industrialized societies. But even in such cultures, cer years ago—i.e. as their signifying orders grew in complexity to meet increasing technological and agricultural needs—they sought larger territories with more natural resources within which to live. This brought about a breakdown of some of the early tribal cultures. As they expanded, the tribes came to accept and accommodate, by necessity or coercion, members of other tribes within their broadening habitats. This led to what the anthropologist Desmond Morris (1969) calls the formation of super-tribes—expanded groupings of people that came about as a consequence of tribal expansion and tribal admixture. The evidence suggests that the first super-tribal arrangements were estab­lished on the basis of a dominant signifying order—typically that of the founding or conquering tribe—so that social interaction and shared activities could unfold efficiently and routinely. The first super-tribes date back only 5,000-6,000 years, when the first cities came onto the scene. Given their larger territorial extension and their acceptance of competing tribal signifying orders, these constituted true societies in the modern sense of the word.

Kaynak: Analyzing cultures: an introduction and handbook / Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron. Bloomington : Indiana University Press, c1999.

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Society, Race, Civilization, Nation-2

Society

A society can thus be defined as a super-tribe, a collectivity of individu­als who, although they may not all have the same tribal origins, never­theless participate, by and large, in the signifying order of the founding or conquering tribe (or tribes). The establishment of a dominant signify­ing order makes it possible for individuals to interact practically and habitually with each other. Unlike tribes, super-tribes can enfold more than one signifying order. As a consequence, individuals may, and typically do, choose to live apart—totally or partially—from the main signifying order.As a concrete example, consider what people living in the modern society known as the United States call loosely "American culture." The signifying order that defines this culture traces its origins primarily to the signifying order of the British people who settled in the United States a few centuries ago. Since then, American society has also ac­commodated and sanctioned aboriginal and other parallel cultural sys­tems, each one entailing a different way of life, a different language, a different system of rituals, etc Moreover, within the dominant signify­ing order, diversification has come about as a consequence of the ten­dency of splinter groups—known as subcultures—to emerge within large and impersonal societies. Thus, it is possible for an individual living in the United States to remain apart from the dominant signify­ing order by espousing a parallel one or becoming a participant in a subcultural one. But very much like tribal people, a city-dwelling indi­vidual living in America today who chooses to live apart from thedominant signifying order will typically face social risks, such as expo­sure to various forms of ridicule or censure and perhaps even exclusion from participation in various institutional systems or communal activi­ties.

Race

Human beings the world over typically classify and think of them­selves as members of races and /or ethnic groups, i.e. as belonging to a group of people with whom they have a common genetic link. But ra­cial or ethnic classifications are often ambiguous and misleading. No two human beings, not even twins, are identical. The proportions of traits, and even the kinds of traits, are distributed differently from one part of the world to another. But, as it turns out, these proportions are quantitatively negligible. Geneticists have yet to turn up a single group of people who can be distinguished from outsiders by their chromo­somes. There is no genetic test or criterion that can be used to deter­mine if one is racially or ethnically, say, Caucasian, Slavic, or Hopi. Populations arc constantly in genetic contact with another. The many varieties of modern Homo sapiens sapiens belong to one interbreeding species, with surprisingly little genetic difference among individuals. In fact, it has been established that 99.9% of DNA sequences are com­mon to all humans (Sagan and Druyan 1992: 415).So, from a purely biological standpoint, human beings defy classifi­cation into types. Nevertheless, the historical record shows that from ancient times people have, for some reason or other (perhaps tribalistic in origin), always felt it necessary to classify themselves in terms of ra­cial or ethnic categories.

The Egyptians, the ancient Greeks of Homer's time, and the Greeks and Romans of classical times, for instance, left paintings and sculptures showing human beings with perceived racial differences. And most languages of the world have words referring to people in terms of physiological, anatomical, and social differences.In the Western world, the systematic study and classification of races was a consequence of the worldwide explorations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which piqued the interest of Europeans in the peoples of other lands. A century later, the Swedish botanist Carolus Linnaeus (1707-1778) was among the first to consider catego­rizing the apparent varieties of human beings. But it was the German scholar Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840) who gave the West­ern world its first racial typology. After examining the skulls and com­paring the physical characteristics of the different peoples of the world, Blumenbach concluded thai humanity had five races: Caucasians (West Asians, north Africans, and Europeans except the Finns and the Saami), Mongolians (other Asian peoples, the Finns and the Saami, and the Inuit of America), Ethiopians (the people of Africa except those of the north), Americans (all aboriginal New World peoples except the Inuit), and Malayans (peoples of the Pacific islands).

These five divisions remained the basis of most racial classifications well into the twentieth century and continue to be commonly accepted in popular thinking even today. But population scientists now recog­nize the indefiniteness and arbitrariness of any such demarcations. In­deed, many individuals can be classified into more than one race or into none. All that can be said here is that the concept of race makes sense, if at all, only in terms of lineage: i.e. people can be said to belong to the same race if they share the same pool of ancestors. But, as it turns out, even this seemingly simple criterion is insufficient for rationalizing a truly scientific classification of humans into discrete biological groups in such a way that everybody belongs to one and only one because, ex­cept for brothers and sisters, no individuals have precisely the same array of ancestors. This is why, rather than using genetic, anatomical, or physiological traits to study human variability, anthropologists to­day prefer to study groups in terms of geographic or social criteria. Race and ethnicity are now viewed by social scientists fundamentally as historical or cultural notions.

Civilization

The term civilization implies essentially a modern society, or group of societies, with a distinctive recorded history and with common institu­tions (religious, political, legal, economic, educational, etc.). A civiliza­tion is, more specifically, a complex social system encompassing a mix­ture of tribal and super-tribal signifying orders, but marked by its own civil (city-based), rather than just tribal or religious, history.

The first civilizations in the current-day Middle East, for example, came onto the scene between 5000 and 3000 BC. Sumer, Babylon, and Egypt were among the first large social groupings to encompass not only a main­stream form of culture, but also a complex diversity of peoples and languages, and to distinguish between civil and religious institutions.Europeans became interested in the civilizations of other lands dur­ing the Enlightenment, when scholars started searching for universal patterns in the history of humanity. But their efforts were somewhat skewed by their tendency to ignore customs that they saw as irrational. In the nineteenth century, on the other hand, philosophers like Johann von Herder (1744-1803) and G. W. E. Hegel (1770-1831) viewed all cul­tural systems as intrinsically valid, equal, and rational in their own terms, springing from a universal propensity of human groups to make sense of the habitats in which they lived. Writing a "rational" history of any civilization, they claimed, would therefore be a futile task, given the lack of universal criteria for defining rationality.

Nation

Like other terms discussed above, nation is a problematic one to define. People experience national sentiments only in relation to some specific situation that they feel unites them in an abstract way—e.g. Americans tend to become nationalistic when American teams or soldiers are in combat in the sports arena or the military one as the case may be. But people tend typically to feel allegiance more to the city, town, or region in which they were reared or in which they reside. This is why they are quick to show loyalty to the sports teams, individual athletes, perform­ers, etc. representing their local area (city, town, etc.) in competitions. In a very real sense, these areas are felt to be communal extensions of personal identity—in semiotic terms, they can be said to be perceived as spatial representations of the collective persona.A remarkable casc-in-point of this tendency is an event that takes place twice a year in the city of Siena. In this Tuscan city, the popular Palio horse race traces its history right back to Siena's origins as a city-state. The city is divided into contradas—streets within the city. A per­son belonging by reason of birth and /or ancestry to a contrada is ex­pected to have allegiance to its totemic symbol (the caterpillar, the duck, etc.) for life. The week preceding the Palio is characterized by elaborate ceremonies and rituals within each contrada, ending with the blessing of the horse. Feelings of loyalty become intense, to the point that spouses belonging to different contradas are expected to leave their immediate family and return to their original folds for the entire week. Emotions run high during the actual horse race in the central Piazza del Campo. The winning jockey is celebrated and glorified; losing jockeys are often denigrated and, not infrequently, even attacked physically. Winning or losing the Palio is a matter of collective contrada pride.

Clearly, the Sienese perceive themselves, first and foremost, as be­longing to a local space, the contrada, which is concretely understand­able in terms of their life experiences, rather than to the city as a whole, let alone the Italian nation. The contrada is felt by the Sienese to be the critical component of identity. Nationalism is, so to speak, an abstract extension of this type of col­lective persona. As such, it reflects the desire felt by people living in large and complex social systems to share values, speak a common lan­guage, and occupy a clearly bounded piece of real estate with each other. The nation concept can be traced to the rise in importance of the ancient city-states. This led, in turn, to the establishment of military and civil systems designed to protect them. The battles fought by armies in the name of Egypt, Rome, and other ancient civilizations stirred the first inklings of nationalistic patriotism.During the Middle Ages, the cultural life of feudal Europe was based on a common inheritance of ideas, social practices, and belief systems transmitted through Latin, the language of the educated classes, and a common religion, Catholic Christianity. However, with the breakup of feudalism other communities and dynasties arose, fos­tering new feelings of nationality (literally, "birth right") in order to win support for their rule. These feelings were strengthened in various countries during the Reformation of the sixteenth century, when the adoption of either Catholicism or Protestantism as a national religion became an added impetus for social cohesion on a broader scale.The turning point in the rise of nationalism in Europe was the French Revolution of 1789. National feeling in France until then was centered in the monarchy. As a result of the Revolution, loyalty to the monarch was replaced by loyalty to the patrie ("fatherland"). This is why the Marseillaise, the anthem of the French Revolution that later became the national anthem, begins with the words Allnns, enfants de la patrie ("March on, children of the fatherland").

In 1789 the medieval French Estates-General, consisting of separate bodies representing the ciergy, the aristocracy, and the common people, was transformed into a National Assembly. Regional divisions, with their separate traditions and rights, were abolished, and France became a uniform and united territory, with common laws and institutions.The ascent of nationalism throughout Europe coincided generally with the spread of the Industrial Revolution, which promoted unified economic development, a working middle class, and parallel forms of representative government. As a consequence, national literatures and artistic forms (in music and the visual arts) arose to express common traditions. New emphasis was given to historical symbols. New holi­days were introduced to commemorate various events in social history. The drafting of national constitutions and the struggle for political rights gave people after the Industrial Revolution the sense of helping to determine their fate as large communities and of sharing responsibil­ity for the future well-being of all nations. At the same time, the growth of trade and industry led to the rise of economic units larger than the traditional cities.

In the period after World War II, successful nationalist movements sprang up throughout the world, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. By 1958 newly established nation-states in those regions included Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, the Sudan, Ghana, the United Arab Re­public (Egypt and Syria), and Iraq. In the 1960s and 1970s Algeria, Libya, and many British, French, and Belgian colonies in Africa became independent. In Eastern Europe in the 1990s, where nationalist passions had largely been held in check since World War II, the decline of Communist rule unleashed separatist forces that contributed to the dis­solution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.

Source: Analyzing cultures: an introduction and handbook / Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron. Bloomington : Indiana University Press, c1999.

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11 Aralık 2007 Salı

The Origins of Culture

Finding hard scientific evidence to explain why culture emerged from the course of human evolution has proved to be a monumental challenge. So, scholars have understandably resorted to speculating or reasoning inferentially about what would happen if modern human beings were somehow forced to survive without culture.
The best examples of this form of inferential thinking have, actually, come not from scientists or philosophers, but from writers of fiction—Daniel Defoe's novel Robinson Crusoe (1719) and William Golding's Lord of the Flies (1954), for instance, deal with intriguing fictional "test cases" of people forced to live outside of a cultural ambiance, inferring what would happen to them because of it and how they would respond to it. Astonishingly, two real test cases turned up unexpectedly in the 1970s, stimulating great interest on the part of scientists worldwide. In 1970, a thirteen-year-old child named Genie was found in a room where she had been living alone since the age of fourteen months (Curtiss 1977). The child could not speak, and appeared to be puzzled by some cultural forms of expression, especially by artistic and narrative forms. It took a considerable amount of instruction to get her to speak and to understand such forms. Genie made considerable progress in a relatively short period of time, but she remained incapable of reaching the levels of ability achieved effortlessly by children who have enjoyed the benefits of a normal cultural upbringing. Then, in 1976 an adolescent boy was found in the forests of Burundi in central Africa. He had been living with monkeys; he walked on his hands and feet; and he climbed trees like an ape (Classen 1991, Candland 1993). The Burundi child, too, was without language, and like Genie experienced great difficulty in learning to speak at high levels of proficiency.

What can be inferred from such cases of so-called "feral" children? The inability of Genie and the Burundi boy to develop a full command of language has been viewed by many linguists as convincing evidence to support Eric Lenneberg's 1967 claim of a critical period for the acquisition of language, i.e. of a biologically-determined timetable for language acquisition that starts at birth and is completed at puberty. On the basis of a large body of clinical studies, Lenneberg had noticed that most aphasias—the partial or total loss of speech due to a disorder in any one of the brain's language centers—were permanent if they occurred after the age of puberty. This suggested to him that the brain lost its capacity to transfer the language functions from the left hemisphere—the seat of language—to the nonverbal right hemisphere after puberty, which it was able to do, to varying degrees, during childhood. Lenneberg concluded that there must be a biologically fixed period for the lateralization of the language functions to the verbal left hemisphere and, more importantly, that such a process was innate and activated by simple exposure to language during childhood. The Genie and Burundi boy cases seem to support this hypothesis, showing that without such exposure during the critical period, the language faculty does not develop as it normally does.

In our view, however, enlisting such abnormal cases of "noncul-tural development" to support one theory or the other is far too speculative. In actual fact, they have further clouded the picture. If language is indeed a special type of innate faculty that develops automatically in humans within a critical period of time by simple exposure to it during childhood, then why did Genie and the Burundi child learn to speak nonetheless after that period, albeit in a rudimentary way? Moreover, a close reading of the research findings on the two feral children indicates that their main area of difficulty was chiefly psychomotor and syntactical in nature—i.e. they had difficulty pronouncing words and putting them together into well-formed sentences. But this did not hamper their ability to understand and get across even complicated ideas through the structures and categories of language that they could use. Another polemical question these cases have raised is the following one: If culture is indeed an external (nonbiological) survival and evolutionary system that has taken over the functions of physical evolution, as sociobiologists would claim, then why did both Genie and the Burundi boy survive without a normal cultural upbringing? Any coevolution theory would have to explain such anomalies much more explicitly.

Although ascertaining why culture came about in the first place remains difficult, determining when it appeared in the human chronicle poses much less of a conundrum. Human evolution probably began with the genus Australopithecus, whose fossils have been discovered at a number of sites in eastern and southern Africa. Dating from more than 4 million years ago (with fragmentary remains tentatively identified from as far back as 5 million years ago), the genus seems to have become extinct about 1.5 million years ago. All the australopithecines were efficiently bipedal and therefore indisputable hominids. But their brain size was only a little larger than that of chimpanzees (about 400 to 500 cc).
By about 1.5 to 2 million years ago, the fossil evidence suggests an evolutionary split in the australopithecine line, with one variety evolving towards the genus Homo, and finally to modern humans, and the other developing into species that eventually became extinct. A number of skulls and jaws from this period, found in Tanzania and Kenya in eastern Africa, have been placed in the category Homo habilis, meaning "handy human." Homo habilis possessed many traits that linked it both with the earlier australopithecines and with later members of the genus Homo—it made tools and it had the ability to communicate in nonverbal ways, especially through gesture (Cartmill, Pilbeam, and Isaac 1986). It seems likely that this species represented the evolutionary transition between the australopithecines and later hominids.

Fossil evidence of a large-brained, small-toothed hominid, known earliest from north Kenya and dating from 1.5 to 1.6 million years ago, has been placed under the rubric of Homo erectus, literally, "erect human." The first part of the time span of Homo erectus, like that of earlier hominids, is limited to southern and eastern Africa. Later—between 700,000 and 1 million years ago—Homo erectus seems to have migrated into the tropical areas of the Old World, and finally, at the close of its evolution, into the temperate parts of Asia. Archeological sites dating from the time of Homo erectus reveal a greater sophistication in tool-making than was found at earlier hominid sites; they also provide suggestive evidence that this species knew how to make fire, that it had developed a sophisticated mode of gestural communication, and that it planned its social activities. The brain sizes of early Homo erectus fossils have been measured to be not much larger than those of previous hominids, ranging from 750 to 800 cc. Later Homo erectus skulls, however, possess brain sizes in the range of 1100 to 1300 cc, which fall within the size variation of Homo sapiens.
Between 200,000 and 300,000 years ago, Homo erectus evolved into Homo sapiens. Although placed in the same genus, the early Homo sapiens beings were not identical in mental abilities and physical appearance to modern humans. The latter, called Homo sapiens sapiens, first appeared around 100,000 years ago. There is some disagreement among paleontologists as to whether the hominid fossil record shows a continuous evolutionary development from Homo sapiens to Homo sapiens sapiens. Suffice it to say here that Homo sapiens groups shared many similar abilities and engaged in very similar social activities —they were highly efficient at adapting to the sometimes harsh climates of Ice Age Europe, they buried their dead deliberately, with the bodies sometimes being accompanied by stone tools, animal bones, and even flowers, and they communicated with both gesture and vocal language. By 30,000 to 40,000 years ago, Homo sapiens had evolved into Homo sapiens sapiens and had developed full language and symbolic abilities.

The most likely estimate, therefore, is that the first true cultures came into existence around 100,000 years ago—a period from which the plaster casts of skulls reveal that both Neanderthal and Cro-Magnon hominids had brains of similar size to ours (Lieberman 1972, 1991). The Cro-Magnons were representatives of the species Homo sapiens sapiens. They lived in western and southern Europe during the last glacial age. The name "Cro-Magnon" is derived from a rock shelter of that name in the Dordogne Department in southwestern France, where skeletal remains were discovered in 1868. The physical characteristics that distinguished the Cro-Magnons from the Neanderthals were a high forehead and a well-defined chin. Artifacts attributed to the earliest period of Cro-Magnon culture demonstrate clearly that they had mastered the art of fashioning many useful instruments from stone, bone, and ivory. They made fitted clothes and decorated their bodies with ornaments of shell and bone. A number of colored paintings left on the walls of caves near their habitats provide clear evidence that their form of social life was indeed based on culture. About 10,000 years ago, they started to domesticate plants and animals, initiating an agricultural revolution that set the stage for the events in human history that eventually led to the founding of the first civilizations.

As the scientific evidence suggests, the emergence of Homo cul-turalis is a consequence of four critical evolutionary events —bipedalism, a brain enlargement unparalleled among species, an extraordinary capacity for tool-making, and the advent of the tribe as the main form of human collective life. But before proceeding with this "evolutionary story," we must express a caveat about portrayals of this very kind. We have drafted our evolutionary narrative on the basis of the relevant scientific facts available. We are however aware that ours is one such story among many other possible ones. We are also aware that our account of the evolutionary antecedents to culture is by far an incomplete one because it lacks any consideration of the transition from bipedalism and brain growth to tribal culture; i.e. our story does not encompass the question of why bipedal apes with large brains felt impelled at a certain point in their evolution to fashion a social order characterized by rituals, a system of ethics, language, art, and so on. Evolutionary events in themselves tell us very little about that remarkable transition. Nevertheless, any coherent discussion of cultural origins cannot ignore the evolutionary findings, even though they must be taken with the proverbial grain of salt.

Source: Analyzing cultures: an introduction and handbook / Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron. Bloomington : Indiana University Press, c1999.

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The Origins of Culture-2

Bipedalism
One of the earliest of the major hominid characteristics to have evolved, distinguishing the species Homo from its nearest primate relatives—the gorilla, chimpanzee, and orangutan—was bipedalism, an adaptation to a completely erect posture and a two-footed striding walk. Almost all other mammals stand, walk, and/or run on four limbs.
Those that stand on two have quite different postures and gaits from humans—kangaroos hop on their two feet; some monkeys only on occasion walk bipedally, especially when carrying food; chimpanzees are capable of brief bipedal walks, but their usual means of locomotion is knuckle-walking, standing on their hind legs but stooping forward, resting their hands on the knuckles rather than on the palms or fingers. So, even though forms of bipedalism are observable in other primates, they are unlike the human type: all other forms of bipedal walking involve straight or bowed spines, bent knees, grasping (prehensile) feet, and some use of the hands to bear part of the body weight during locomotion. The uniquely S-shaped spinal column of humans places the center of gravity of the body directly over the area of support provided by the feet, thus giving stability and balance in the upright position.

Tools
Fossils discovered in Africa provide evidence that hominids walked erect and had a bipedal stride even before the great increase in their brain size. Complete bipedalism freed the human hand, allowing it to become a supremely sensitive limb for precise manipulation and grasping. The most important structural detail in this refinement was the elongated human thumb, which could rotate freely for the first time and, thus, be fully opposable to the other fingers. No doubt, this development made tool making and tool use possible. Moreover, some linguists claim that the erect posture gave rise to the subsequent evolution nf the physiological apparatus for speech, since it brought about the lowering and positioning of the larynx for controlled breathing. In a phrase, bipedalism, tool-making, and language were probably intertwined in their origins (Wilson 1998).
Although other species, including some non-primate ones, are capable of tool use, only in the human species did complete bipedalism free the hand sufficiently to allow it to become a supremely sensitive and precise manipulator and grasper, thus permitting proficient tool making and tool use in the species. The earliest stone tools date back to about 2.5 million years ago. By 1.5 million years ago, sites in various parts of eastern Africa contain not only many stone tools, but also animal bones with scratch marks that research has shown could only have been left by human-like cutting actions. One thing is certain—only in the human species does one find the capacity to fashion a great diversity of tools from the raw materials found in the environment to meet virtually any need that may arise (Montagu 1983, Noble and Davidson 1996: 22-56).

Brain Growth

Shortly after becoming bipedal, the evidence suggests, the human species underwent rapid brain expansion. In the course of human evolution the size of the brain has more than tripled. Modern humans have a braincase volume of between 1300 and 1500 cc. The human brain has also developed three major structural components that undergird the unique mental capacities of the species—the large dome-shaped cerebrum, the smaller somewhat spherical cerebellum, and the brainstem. The size of the brain does not determine the degree of intelligence of the individual; this appears to be determined instead by the number and type of functioning neurons (nerve cells) and how they are structurally connected with one another. And since neuronal connections are conditioned by environmental input, the most likely hypothesis is that any form of intelligence, however it is defined, is most likely a consequence of upbringing. Unlike the early hominid adult skulls, with their sloping foreheads and prominent jaws, the modern human skull —with biologically insignificant variations—retains a proportionately large size, in relation to the rest of the body.
The large brain of modern-day Homo culturalis is more than double that of early tool-makers. This great increase in brain size was achieved by the process of neoteny, i.e. by the prolongation of the juvenile stage of brain and skull development in neonates (newborns). As a result, human infants must go through an extended period of dependency on, and stimulation by, adults. In the absence of this close external bond in the early years of life, the development of the infant's brain would remain incomplete.

The Tribe

Like most other species, humans have always lived in groups. Group life enhances survivability by providing a collective form of protection and shelter against enemies and abrupt changes in the surroundings. But at some point in their evolutionary history—probably around 100,000 years ago—bipedal hominids had become so adept at tool-making, communicating, and thinking in symbols that they became consciously aware of the advantages of a group life based on a common system of representational activities. By around 30,000 to 40,000 years ago, the archeological evidence suggests, in fact, that hominid groups became increasingly characterized by communal customs, language, and the transmission of technological knowledge to subsequent generations. Anthropologists have designated this form of group life tribal.
The tribal form of social life has not disappeared from the human story. It has left its "archetypal" influence in the human psyche. In our view, this is the reason why the tribe remains the type of collectivity to which human beings instinctively relate even in modern times. In complex city-societies, where various cultures, subcultures, countercultures, and parallel cultures exist in constant competition with each other, where the shared territory is so large that it constitutes a mere abstraction, the tendency for individuals to relate to tribal-type groupings that exist within the larger societal context manifests itself regularly. People continue to perceive their membership in smaller groups as more directly meaningful to their lives than allegiance to the larger society and/or nation. This inclination towards tribalism, as Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980) emphasized, reverberates constantly within modern-day humans, and may be the source of the angst and sense of alienation that many modern-day city-dwelling individuals feel, living as they do in large, impersonal social systems.

Source: Analyzing cultures: an introduction and handbook / Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron. Bloomington : Indiana University Press, c1999

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9 Aralık 2007 Pazar

Defining Culture

In their classic study of culture several decades ago, the anthropologists Kroeber and Kluckholn (1963) found 150 qualitatively distinct definitions of this term scattered throughout the scientific literature. Interestingly, they found broad consensus on two points: (1) that culture is a way of life based on some system of shared meanings; and (2) that it is passed on from generation to generation through this very system. We will refer henceforward to this system as the signifying order. For the present purposes, suffice it to say that the signifying order is the aggregate of the signs (words, gestures, visual symbols, etc.), codes (language, art, etc.), and texts (conversations, compositions, etc.) that a social group creates and utilizes in order to carry out its daily life routines and to plan its activities for the future. Each culture, no matter how technologically advanced it may be, traces its origins to an early tribal signifying order. Human culture can thus be defined as a way of life based on a signifying order developed originally in a tribal context that is passed along through the signifying order from one generation to the next.
The signifying order is what the philosopher Karl Popper (1902-1994) called a "World 3" state of knowing. Popper classified human knowing into three states, which he called "Worlds." "World 1" is a state of sensory knowing. This inheres in the sensory, unreflective experiences humans have of physical objects and activities, as governed by neuronal signals—electrical impulses between brain cells— transmitting messages along nerve paths that cause muscles to contract or limbs to move, and sensory systems to respond to perceptual input. "World 2" is a state of subjective knowing. This inheres in the subjective responses humans have to perceptual input. This is the level at which a "sense of Self" endows an individual with the ability to differentiate h/erself from the beings, objects, and events present in the world. "World 3" is a state of communal knmving. This inheres in the systematic form of knowing with which culture equips human beings for coping with daily life and for living together in groups.
The most crucial difference between human knowing and that of all other species can be discerned in World 3 states. There is no evidence to suggest that other species are capable of these states to the extent that humans are, if at all; i.e. it is unlikely that animals are capable of producing and understanding art, language, science, or any other World 3 form of knowing and communicating. Its capacity for and reliance upon World 3 states for daily life make Homo culturalis unique among species.

Source: Analyzing cultures: an introduction and handbook / Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron. Bloomington : Indiana University Press, c1999.

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8 Aralık 2007 Cumartesi

What is Culture?

Our history is written in our genes and in our actions. We can do little about the former, but virtually every­thing about the latter, if we are a free people.Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza (1995: xi)

PRELIMINARY REMARKS
The emergence of Homo culturalis onto the evolutionary scene can be traced originally to the development within the human spe­cies of an extremely large brain, averaging 1400 cc/85.4 cu. in., more than 2 million years ago.
Humankind's ability and disposition to think and plan consciously, to transmit learned skills to subsequent generations knowingly, to establish social relationships in response to need, and to modify the environment creatively are the felicitous con­sequences of that momentous evolutionary event. The brain's great size, complexity, and slow rate of maturation, with connections among its nerve cells being added through the pre-pubescent years of life, has made it possible for Homo culturalis, in effect, to step outside the slow forces of biological evolution and to meet new environmental demands by means of conscious rapid adjustments, rather than by force of ge­netic adaptation: i.e. it has bestowed upon the human species the abil­ity to survive through intelligent activities in a wide range of habitats and in extreme environmental conditions without further species dif­ferentiation. However, in balance, the prolonged juvenile stage of brain and skull development in relation to the time required to reach sexual maturity has exposed neonatal human beings to unparalleled risks among primates. Each new infant is born with relatively few innate traits yet with a vast number of potential behaviors, and therefore must be reared in a cultural setting so that it can achieve its biological poten­tial. In a phrase, Culture has taken over from Nature in guaranteeing [lie survival of the human species and in charting its future evolution.

Evidence from the field of paleontology, the science of fossil interpre­tation, suggests that cultures have ancient origins. The fashioning of tools, the earmark of early cultures, was accomplished at least 2.5 mil­lion years ago, as was the use of gesture for communication. Gradually, planned hunting, fire-making, the weaving of cloth, and the ritualized burial of the dead became well-established characteristics of hominid groups. By about 100,000 years ago, the making of art, communication by means of language, and communally-established systems of ethics became the distinctive attributes of the first human tribes. Since then culture, in the sense of individuals living together, thinking and plan­ning consciously, transmitting skills and systems of social relationships to each other through language, and working together to modify the environment, has become the defining attribute of the human species.

So, the question of what is culture is hardly a trivial one. To under­stand human nature is to unravel the raison d'etre of culture. Although interest in culture is as old as human history, the first scientific defini­tion of culture had to await the nineteenth century, when the British anthropologist Edward B. Tylor defined it in his 1871 book Primitive Culture as "a complex whole including knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capability or habit acquired by human be­ings as members of society." Tylor's definition was also one of the first ever to differentiate qualitatively between culture and society. Although these terms continue to be used commonly as synonyms in many lan­guages, in actual fact they refer to different things. Within a social col­lectivity, there can, and frequently does, exist more than one culture. In an opposite manner, several societies can be thought of as belonging to the same general culture—e.g. European culture, Asian culture, African culture, etc. Societies are simultaneously the geographical and histori­cal "reifications" (manifestations) of cultures: i.e. they have existence in time and space, enfolding the signifying processes that shape and regu­late the lives of the people who live within them.

Like other species, Homo culturalis has always lived in groups for protection and refuge, thus enhancing its survivability. But, as Tylor's definition implies, human societies involve much more than instinctive group behavior. The primary purpose of this text is, as a matter of fact, to highlight those aspects of human gregarious life that transcend the survival functions of other animal groupings.

The amount and diversity of scientific research that has been con­ducted on cultural systems since the publication of Tylor's book in 1871 have reached mind-boggling proportions. And yet, the reason culture came about in the first place remains largely an enigma to this day, even though various intriguing hypotheses about its origins and raison d'etre have been formulated on the basis of a veritable stockpile of pale-ontological and archeological information. In this opening chapter, we will start our excursion into culture with a panoramic survey of those hypotheses. Needless to say, we cannot possibly go into any depth or detail here. In one chapter, all we can really do is scratch the surface of the historical record. We will therefore be selective, highlighting those ideas that we consider to be relevant to the focus of this text, even if this entails leaving out many others whose influence on the develop­ment of culture theory is hardly negligible. After a brief historical foray, we will move on to a succinct consideration of some rudimen­tary matters, casting a glance at what is most prominent in discussions about the origins of culture with an eye towards putting forth a work­ing semiotic definition of this phenomenon that reflects the paleon-tological record. Finally, we will describe the principal spheres —kinship, religious, political, legal, economic, and educational—that constitute the institutional systems that have emerged to regulate social interaction in the human species.

As the reader may have surmised by now, we have coined the term Homo culturalis simply as a stylistic device. There is no evidence to sug­gest the existence of a species identifiable as Homo culturalis, separable or differentiable in evolutionary lineage from the other species of Homo. The term is a rhetorical figure, meant to highlight the fact that in the evolutionary heritage of human beings, culture stands out as a truly remarkable attainment.

Source: Analyzing cultures: an introduction and handbook / Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron. Bloomington : Indiana University Press, c1999.

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7 Aralık 2007 Cuma

Differences Between Speech & Writing

• Speech is time-bound, dynamic, transient. It is part of an interaction in which both participants are usually present, and the speaker has a particular addressee (or several addressees) in mind...
• The spontaneity and seed of most speech exchanges make it difficult to engage in complex advance planning. The pressure to think while talking promotes looser construction, repetition, rephrasing, and comment clause. Intonation and pause divide long utterances into manageable chunks, but sentences boundaries are often unclear.
• Because participants are typically in face-to- face interaction, they can rely on such extralinguistic cues as facial expression and gesture to aid meaning (feedback). The lexicon of speech is often characteristically vague, using words which refer directly to the situation (deictic expressions, such as that one, in here, right now).
• Many words and constructions are characteristic of (especially informal) speech. Lengthy coordinate sentences are normal, and are often of considerable complexity. Nonsense vocabulary is not usually written, and may have no standard spelling. Obscenity may be replaced by graphic euphemism (f***). Slang and grammatical informality, such as contracted forms (isn't, he's) may be frowned upon.
• Speech is very suited to social or 'phatic' functions, such as passing the time of day, or any situation where casual and unplanned discourse is desirable. It is also good at expressing social relationships, and personal opinions and attitudes, due to the vast range of nuances which can be expressed by the prosody and accompanying non-verbal features
• There is an opportunity to rethink an utterance while it is in progress (starting again, adding a qualification). However, errors, once spoken, cannot be withdrawn (the one exception is when a sound engineer performs wonders of auditory plastics surgery on a tape-recording of nonfluent speech); the speaker must live with the consequences. Interruptions and overlapping speech are normal and highly audible.
• Unique features of speech include most of the prosody. The many nuances of intonation, as well as contrast of loudness, tempo, rhythm, and other tones of voice cannot be written down with much efficiency.

• Writing is space-bound, static, permanent. It is the result of a situation in which the writer is usually distant from the reader, and often does not know who the reader is going to be (except in a very vague sense, as in poetry).
• Writing allows repeated reading and close analysis, and promotes the development of careful organization and compact expression, with often intricate sentence structure. Units of discourse (sentences, paragraphs) are usually easy to identify through punctuation and layout.
• Lack of visual contact means that participants cannot rely on context to make their meaning clear; nor is there any immediate feedback. Most writing therefore avoids the use of deictic expressions, which are likely to be ambiguous. Writers must also anticipate the effects of the time-lag between production and reception, and the problems posed by having their language read and interpreted by many recipients in diverse settings.
• Some words and constructions are characteristic of writing, such as multiple instances of subordination in the same sentence, elaborately balanced syntactic patterns, and the long (often multi-page) sentences found in some legal documents. Certain items of vocabulary are never spoken, such as the longer names of chemical compounds.
• Writing is very suited to the recording of facts and the communication of ideas, and to tasks of memory and learning. Written records are easier to keep and scan; tables demonstrate relationships between things; notes and lists provide mnemonics; and text can be red at speeds which suit a person's ability to learn.
• Errors and other perceived inadequacies in our writing can be eliminated in later drafts without the reader ever knowing they were there. Interruptions, if they have occurred while writing, are also invisible in the final product.
• Unique features of writing include pages, lines, capitalization, spatial organization, and several aspects of punctuation. Only a very few graphic conventions relate to prosody, such as question marks and underlining for emphasis. Several written genres (e.g. timetables, graphs, complex
formulae) cannot be read aloud efficiently, but have to be assimilated visually.

- Edited from course notes.

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6 Aralık 2007 Perşembe

Writing

Language manifests itself as speech, i.e. as articulated sounds. But speech can also be represented visually in the graphic medium. The use of visual signs to represent speech is known as writing.


In evolutionary terms writing did not develop as a simple substitute for speech. The earliest graphic signs so far discovered were unearthed in western Asia from the Neolithic era. They are elemental shapes on clay tokens that were probably used as image-making forms or casts (Schmandt-Besserat 1978,1992).

The earliest writing systems were all independent of speech and not alphabetic or syllabic in nature. They were pictorial. In the ancient civilization of Sumer around 3500 BC, for instance, pictorial writing was used to record agricultural transactions and astronomical observations. Most of the Sumerian pictographs represented nouns such as stars and animals, with a few for such qualisigns as "small," "big," and "bright." A few centuries later, this pictographic system was expanded to include verbs: to sleep, for example, was represented by a person in a supine position. To facilitate the speed of writing, the Sumerians eventually streamlined their pictographs and transformed them into symbols for the actual sounds of speech. These were written down on clay tablets with a stylus in a form of writing known as cuneiform.

Pictographs are images of objects, people, or events—for example, a drawing of the sun stands for the spoken word sun. Pictographic forms of writing are still in existence today even in alphabet-using cultures: e.g. the images of males and females painted on bathroom doors are examples of pictographs. More abstract forms of pictographic signs are called ideographs (or ideograms). These may bear some resemblance to their referents, but assume much more of a conventional knowledge of the relation between signifier and signified on the part of the user. International symbols for such things as public telephones, washrooms, etc. are all ideographic. More abstract ideographs are known as logographs (or logograms). These show a highly-evolved form of symbolicity which, nevertheless, has a basis in iconicity. A logographic system combines various pictographs for the purpose of indicating non-picturable ideas. Thus, the Chinese pictographs for sun and tree are combined to represent the Chinese spoken word for east.
By about 3000 BC the ancient Egyptians also used a pictographic script—known as hieroglyphic. But in their case, the pictographs were becoming more alphabetic, standing for parts of words. Hieroglyphic writing was used to record hymns and prayers, to register the names and titles of individuals and deities, and to record various community activities—hieroglyphic derives from Greek hieros "holy" and glyphein "to carve."
From such pictographic-ideographic systems emerged the first syllables. These were systems of signs for representing syllables. They were developed by the Semitic peoples of Palestine and Syria from the ideographs of the Egyptian system during the last half of the second millennium BC. Syllables are still used in some cultures. Japanese, for example, is still written with two complete syllabaries—the hiragana and the katakana—devised to supplement the characters originally taken over from Chinese.

The emergence of syllabaries on the scene bears witness to the fact that, once writing became a flourishing enterprise in the ancient civilizations, it was convenient for it to be produced without pictures. The transition from pictorial to sound representation—the alphabet principle—came about to make writing rapid and efficient in its use of space. So, for example, instead of drawing the full head of an ox (1) only its bare outline was drawn; which (2) stood for the ox; which (3) eventually came to stand for the word for ox (aleph in Hebrew); and which (4) finally stood just for the first sound in the word (a for aleph). Stage (4) occurred around 1000 BC when the ancient Phoenicians systematically created the first true alphabetic system for recording sounds. The Greeks adopted the Phoenician alphabet and started the practice of naming each symbol by such words as alpha, beta, gamma, etc., which were imitations of Phoenician words: aleph "ox," beth "house," gimel "camel," etc. Alphabetic writing has become the norm in Western cultures. But in every alphabetic symbol that we now use to record our thoughts abstractly, there is an iconic history and prehistory that has become dim or virtually unseeable because our eyes are no longer trained to extract pictorial meaning from it.

Alphabetic writing is a truly remarkable achievement. It has made possible the recording and transmission of knowledge. Indeed, in Western culture to be an alphabet-user is to be literate and thus educated. So close is the link between the two that we can scarcely think of knowledge unless it is recorded in some alphabetic form and preserved in some book form for posterity; nor can we think of a person as educated unless we know that s/he can read and write verbal texts competently. In order to read and write, one must follow a sequence of characters arranged in a particular spatial order. For example, English writing flows from left to right, Hebrew from right to left, and Chinese from top to bottom. In all alphabet-using cultures, the ability to read and write does not emerge spontaneously. The child must be trained to recognize the alphabetic system and use it systematically to encode and decode written texts.

Besides its intrinsic value, the ability to read has economic consequences in modern societies. Adults who are better-than-average readers are more likely to have high-paying jobs. The growing technologization of society has brought along with it increasing demands for literacy, which the schools are hard pressed to meet. The reading ability needed to comprehend materials important to daily living, such as income tax forms and newspapers, has been estimated to be as high as the twelfth-grade level in North America. Some efforts have been made to simplify forms and manuals, but the lack of sufficient reading ability definitely impairs a person’s capacity to function in modern society.

Source: Analyzing cultures: an introduction and handbook / Marcel Danesi and Paul Perron. Bloomington : Indiana University Press, c1999.

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